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In this supporting information, we provide additional numerical results to show the robustness of our conclusions in the main text.
Results for different benefit-to-cost ratios
In Figure S1 we show the cooperation level from commitment strategies, IRCOM and COMP, as a function of the cost of arranging commitment and the compensation cost δ, the improvement in cooperation level compared to the case where there is no IRCOM, and such an improvement in percentage. We also plot the same quantity for different b/c. In general, we observe that improvement is always possible, and furthermore, the larger b/c (i.e. the less harsh the PD), the larger the improvement is achieved. Figure S2 shows the frequency of COMP and IRCOM (at the optimal confidence threshold)
for different values of and δ, and for different b/c ratios. In general, for sufficiently large δ and low , IRCOM dominates the population. Interestingly, in contrast to COMP, it is not always the case that the frequency of IRCOM is smaller for larger . IRCOM is actually more frequent when is sufficiently high, which is larger for larger b/c.
More efficient intention recognition
In the main text we have used a very inefficient intention recognition model, where the accuracy of intention recognition is a random number derived from [0, 1]. It is not surprising that the performance of the intention recognition strategy solely-which corresponds to IRCOM with θ = 0, is very poor. In the sequel, let us study the model using more efficient intention recognition models ( Figure S3 ). interactions between two players (or high enough probabilities of a next interaction 4, 5 ) , given that the noise is small enough. Normally, the more an intention recognizer interacts with a fixed co-player, the better it predicts its co-player's intention. For example, this holds for the two intention recognition models described in 2, 3 . Furthermore, in 1 , the authors present experimental evidence showing that, in a one-shot PD, subjects of only brief acquaintance were able to recognize players with an intention to defect with more than twice chance accuracy.
The results show that, whenever the intention recognition model is efficient enough, the intention recognition strategy solely (i.e. IRCOM with θ = 0) performs quite well, complying with the results obtained in 2, 3 , where concrete intention recognition models are deployed.
However, when a quite strong commitment deal can be envisaged ( Figure S3a ), arranging it can still glean some evolutionary advantage. But in case that only weak commitment deals can be arranged ( Figure S3b) , it is then more beneficial to rely, even exclusively, on the intention recognition strategy should it be efficient enough.
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